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The nature of the relationship between wineries and wine grape growers is largely one of 
interdependence; to produce good quality wines, wineries need a reliable supply of good 
quality grapes. Both the wineries and grape growers report a high degree of trust, 
satisfaction and commitment in their relationship with their most preferred trading 
partner. While the wineries exercise the majority of power in the relationship, when 
accompanied by constant communication that seeks to improve wine quality and to 
coordinate harvest dates, grape growers are not subjected to any coercive influence 




The Australian wine industry has experienced unprecedented growth over the past 
decade, fuelled by the rapid expansion in export sales. In the past, wineries have often 
experienced significant shortfalls in procuring sufficient quantities of good quality 
grapes. Competition between the wineries for the limited supply has understandably 
increased prices to the extent where many market analysts believe that sales have been 
adversely affected, especially in those price conscious segments of the market where the 
majority of Australian wines compete (Reedman 2000). Not unexpectedly, there has also 
been a dramatic increase in the area of wine grapes planted to meet the increased demand, 
so much so, that Stanford and Strachan (1999) estimate that there is currently a surplus of 
some 120,000 tonnes of wine grapes. In disposing of this surplus, wine grape prices will 
inevitably decline, providing the major wine producers with the opportunity to recapture 
a larger share of the market. However, if Australia wants to maintain its position in the 
market against increasing price competition, continual improvements in the quality of the 
wine produced will also be required.  
 
If quality wines are to be produced, quality grapes must be sourced from the vineyard. In 
the past, wineries have sought to control the quality of the grapes produced through direct 
ownership. Grapes produced on the property have been used to manufacture wines on the 
property, often under the direction of the owner-manager who is both viticulturist and 
winemaker. However, as the industry has expanded to take advantage of the opportunities 
presented in both domestic and export markets, in order to control overhead costs and to 
concentrate on core competencies, wineries are looking towards contract grape growers 
as a way of facilitating their expansion. This effectively means that if wineries are to 
obtain grapes of the desired quality, growers and winemakers need to work cooperatively 
(Donald and Georgiadis 2000). Growers need to know what varieties of grapes to grow 
and how to grow them. By regularly visiting and working closely with grape growers, the 
winemaker is not only able to source fruit of the desired variety, ripeness or quality, but 
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by assisting the grape grower in monitoring costs and improving grape quality, to 
significantly improve returns for the grower (Osborn 2000). This interdependence 
between grape growers and winemakers suggests that long-term relationships need to be 
developed and maintained for each to remain competitive (Beuman and McLachlin 
2000). 
 
The emergence of buyer-seller relationships 
 
In the pursuit of superior quality and improved competitiveness, firms are establishing 
closer relationships with their suppliers because it enables them to be more efficient and 
cost effective (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995). By developing relationships with their 
suppliers, buyers and sellers can achieve cost savings through reduced search and 
evaluation costs, reduced transaction costs (Hakansson 1982) and the learning effects and 
relationship specific scale economies (Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995).  
 
However, the primary reason for establishing relationships with suppliers is that 
customers realise that suppliers create value (Evans and Laskin 1994). By developing 
long-term relationships, customers can anticipate improved access to a more reliable 
supply of production inputs (Hakansson 1982), improved product quality and 
performance (Han, Wilson and Dant 1993), and a higher level of technical interaction and 
technical assistance (Cunningham and Homse 1982). Through better understanding and 
satisfying customers needs, suppliers can achieve greater customer loyalty and higher 
repeat sales (Evans and Laskin 1994). Buyers may become less sensitive to price 
competition and suppliers may benefit from higher prices (Kalwani and Narayandas 
1995). Both parties are better able to plan and forecast production schedules (Lohtia and 
Krapfel 1994) and to coordinate deliveries (Easton and Araujo 1994). However, the 
greatest benefit arising from long-term relationships is the reduction in uncertainty 
(Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Hakansson 1982; Heide and John 1990; Noordewier, John 
and Niven 1990; Oliver 1990; Han, Wilson and Dant 1993). 
 
While an extensive amount of literature has appeared in recent years identifying the 
various factors impacting upon the establishment and maintenance of long-term buyer 
seller relationships (Ford 1980; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Wilson 1995), the greatest 
support has emerged for the key constructs of satisfaction, trust and commitment 
(Anderson and Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Han, Wilson and Dant 1993; 
Morgan and Hunt 1994). More recently, communication has emerged as the principal 
mechanism for the exchange of information that may reduce certain types of risk 
perceived by either one of the parties to the transaction. Any uncertainty about a 
customer’s or supplier’s organisational structure, viability, methods of operation, 
technical expertise or competence can be resolved by communication between the firms 
(Cunningham and Turnbull 1982). Furthermore, wherever a firm wishes to improve its 
relationship with a partner, the firm must commit various resources to the relationship. 
Any resource committed above and beyond that required to execute the current exchange 
can be regarded as an investment (Campbell and Wilson 1996). By their very nature, such 
relationship specific investments are seldom deployable in an alternative relationship, 
thereby exposing the firm to the possibility of exploitation by a more opportunistic 
trading partner (Anderson and Weitz 1992). However, the extent to which a firm will be 
influenced by, or have influence over, its partner will be a function not only of the 
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magnitude of those investments (Lohtia and Krapfel 1994), but also the benefits the firm 
can obtain by maintaining the relationship (Heide and John 1988). 
 
Using the key dimensions of satisfaction (Frazier 1983; Anderson and Narus 1990), trust 
(Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman 1993; Ganesan 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994) and 
commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995; Morgan 
and Hunt 1994), dependence (Heide and John 1988) and communication and information 
exchange (Cunningham and Turnbull 1982; Frazier and Summers 1984), we propose to 
investigate the nature of the long-term relationships that exist between grape growers and 




To succeed in the industrial market, a supplier must understand the wants and needs of its 
customers and aim to satisfy those needs more effectively than the competition. To 
become more competitive, firms need to provide augmented products (and services) 
which offer customers more than they think is necessary or have come to expect. 
 
Expectations are beliefs about the likelihood that a product is associated with certain 
attributes, benefits or outcomes (Spreng, MacKenzie and Olshavsky 1996). According to 
the disconfirmation of expectations model, customer satisfaction is the result of a 
comparison between the firm’s performance and customer’s expectations. Whenever 
performance exceeds perceived expectations, satisfaction will emerge. Conversely, 
whenever performance falls below expectations, customers will become dissatisfied.  
 
However, Fornell et al (1996) believe that overall customer satisfaction is influenced by 
the customer’s perceived quality, perceived value and the customer’s expectations. 
Perceived quality or performance is derived from the manner in which the product 
performs (technical quality) and the manner in which the customer receives the product 
(functional quality). In the context of the wine industry, such would imply that a winery 
not only receives grapes of the desired maturity, substantially free of 
material-other-than-grapes and within the desired temperature range, but it receives the 
grapes when it wants them. 
  
Perceived value is the perceived level of product quality relative to the price paid. Value 
is achieved when the proper function is secured for the proper cost. Here, the concept of 
value-in-use constitutes the price that will equalise the overall costs and benefits of using 
one product over another (Hutt and Speh 1995). Throughout the wine industry, the 
concept of end wine quality and the desired trade-off between yield and price is reflected 
in both the proportion of costs that the grapes contribute to the end product and the 
subsequent price position that the wine occupies on a retail shelf.  
 
Finally, the customer’s expectations will relate favourably or unfavourably, to whatever 
prior experience the customer may have had with the supplier’s offer and a forecast of the 
supplier’s ability to continue to meet those expectations in the future. Cardozo and 
Cagley (1971) and Puto, Patton and King (1985) demonstrate that buyers are strongly 
attracted to well-known or existing suppliers, for current suppliers are perceived as being 
less risky.  
 4
Channel conflict is the only construct that is considered to have a direct negative effect on 
satisfaction (Frazier, Gill and Kale 1989). Firms that are able to lower the overall level of 
conflict in their working relationship experience greater satisfaction (Anderson and 
Narus 1990). Conflict in channel relationships occurs most often over economic issues 
(Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 1999). Channel members that are satisfied with the 
economic rewards that flow from their relationship perceive their partner as advancing 
their goals as opposed to impeding or preventing them. Consequently, satisfaction has 
been described as the buyer’s belief that they will be adequately rewarded for the 
sacrifices they have undergone in facilitating the exchange (Yi 1990). Both Frazier 
(1983) and Anderson and Narus (1990) suggest that satisfaction with past outcomes will 
indicate equity in the exchange. Equitable outcomes provide confidence that neither party 
has been taken advantage of in the relationship and that both parties are concerned about 
their mutual welfare.  
 
Satisfaction will also decrease when coercive sources of power are employed (Frazier 
1983). Coercive influence strategies typically include threats and promises. When a 
channel partner frequently pressures or coerces another firm into taking some action that 
it would not have otherwise taken or to forgo some positive outcome, the focal firm will 
feel tension and frustration because its decision autonomy is constrained. While the use of 
coercive influence strategies is often associated with organisational size, the more 
significant influences arise from the relative dependence one firm has upon another 




If there is to be a meaningful long-term relationship, buyers and sellers must learn to trust 
their opposite partner to fulfil their obligations (Han, Wilson and Dant 1993; Morgan and 
Hunt 1994). Anderson and Narus (1990) view trust as the belief that a partner will 
perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm and not to take 
unexpected actions that may result in negative outcomes. Moorman, Deshpande and 
Zaltman (1993) define trust as the willingness to rely upon an exchange partner in whom 
one has confidence. Both of these definitions view trust as a behavioural intention that 
reflects reliance on the other partner, but in so doing, involves uncertainty and 
vulnerability. 
 
High levels of trust enable both firms to focus on the longer-term benefits of the exchange 
(Ganesan 1994). When trust exists, both buyers and suppliers believe that long-term 
relationship specific investments can be made with limited risk because both parties will 
refrain from using their power to renege on contracts or to use a change in circumstances 
to obtain profits in their own favour. Trust reduces the need for structural mechanisms of 
control (Achrol 1997) and firms learn to become more interdependent (Kumar 1996). 
Trust increases the partners tolerance for each others behaviour, facilitating the informal 
resolution of conflict, which in turn, allows the partners to better adapt to the needs and 
capabilities of their counterpart (Hakansson and Sharma 1996). 
 
Trust is developed from the constant and detailed exchange of information which reduces 
the uncertainty of performance and the continued exhibition of commitment which 
nurtures and maintains the exchange relationship (Han, Wilson and Dant 1993). 
 5
Meaningful communication and cooperation between firms in a working partnership is a 
necessary antecedent of trust (Anderson and Narus 1990). Once trust is established, firms 
learn that coordinated joint efforts lead to outcomes that exceed those that the firm could 
achieve if it acted solely in its own best interests. 
 
However, trust between firms does not occur automatically. Experience with the channel 
partner breeds trust (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Anderson and Weitz 1989). Achieving 
a trusting relationship and a reputation for trustworthiness, requires a deliberate strategy 
of forbearance with a view towards future pay-offs and accumulated evidence of 
non-reneging behaviour (Parkhe 1993). With trust, there is an increasing willingness to 
put oneself at risk, be it through intimate disclosure, reliance on another’s promises or 
sacrificing present rewards for future gains. Trust therefore results from the expertise, 
reliability or intentionality of the partner. Swan, Trawick and Silva (1985) indicate how 
competence, customer orientation, honesty, dependability and likeability are the key 
dimensions in developing trust between sales representatives and their customers. 
Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) argue that the interpersonal factors that most 





Firms that trust their partner are more committed to their relationship (Anderson and 
Narus 1990; Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995). Trust and commitment encourage 
firms to work at preserving relationship investments by cooperating with exchange 
partners, to resist short-term alternatives in favour of expected long-term benefits and to 
view potentially high risk actions as being prudent because of the belief that partners will 
not act opportunistically (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  
 
Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) define commitment as an enduring desire to 
maintain a valued relationship. Morgan and Hunt (1994) propose that a firm will commit 
to an exchange partner when the relationship is considered so important as to warrant 
maximum efforts to maintain it. Such implies that the relationship is important and that 
there is a desire to continue the relationship into the future (Wilson 1995).  Hakansson 
and Snehota (1995) see commitment as the tendency to persist with a course of action, 
often without an apparent causal motive, on the basis of some vague expectation. Thus, to 
some extent, a commitment is an act of faith by which the respective parties handle 
uncertainty and complexity.  
 
However, commitment is comprised of at least two components; an attitudinal 
component and an instrumental component (Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995). 
Commitment is most often seen as an attitudinal construct described in terms of affective 
commitment, psychological attachment, identification, affiliation and value congruence. 
This type of commitment represents a partisan affective attachment to the goals and 
values of an organisation. People develop affective commitment towards organisations 
they feel they belong to, which provide them with assistance and support during difficult 
times, offer long term security or returns and employment and whose future and fortunes 
they feel they can actively influence (Achrol 1997). Osborn (2000) describes how by 
informing growers of the accolades given to a particular wine, recognising and praising 
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the grower, growers find comfort and winemakers achieve the desired quality. Avery 
(2000) describes how grape growers proudly display and introduce others to the wines 
their grapes were used to produce.   
 
However, attitudinal commitment alone is often insufficient. Commitments that are not 
supported by investments lack staying power (Achrol 1997). Such investments have been 
described variously to include pledges, credible commitments, idiosyncratic investments 
and the dedicated allocation of resources (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Such credible 
commitments act as powerful self-interest stakes in exchange relationships. All things 
being equal, these investments reinforce and escalate commitment over time. However, 
each firm’s commitment to the relationship is based on its perception of its partner’s 
commitment. The larger the resources pledged by both firms, the more significant the 
self-interest stakes created for each, but when firms commit disproportionately to the 
relationship, the less committed party may enjoy a relative advantage (Gundlach, Achrol 




Dependence refers to the firm’s need to maintain the channel relationship in order to 
achieve desired goals (Frazier, Gill and Kale 1989). Dependence can therefore be 
regarded as the price the focal firm has to pay for the benefits that the relationship 
bestows (Easton 1992). As such, dependence is partly a matter of choice and partly a 
matter of circumstances.  
 
When the outcomes obtained from the relationship are important or highly valued, the 
focal firm is said to be more dependent upon its partner (Heidi and John 1988). The same 
is true when the magnitude of the exchange is higher. The higher the percentage of sales 
and profits that a supplier’s product line provides and the greater the expectations of sales 
and profits in the future, the greater the focal firm’s dependence (Frazier, Gill and Kale 
1989).  
  
Dependence is also increased when the outcomes available from the relationship are 
comparatively higher than or better than the outcomes available from any alternative 
relationship. Firms dealing with the best supplier are more dependent because the 
outcomes associated with dealing that supplier are better than those available from poor 
performing suppliers (Heidi and John 1988). In this respect, Anderson and Narus (1990) 
view dependence in the relationship as the outcomes given comparison level for 
alternatives. In this context, dependence is a measure that represents the overall quality of 
outcomes available to the focal firm from the best alternative exchange relationship. 
 
When fewer alternative sources of exchange are available to the focal firm, or when 
replacing or substituting a current exchange partner is difficult because there are fewer 
potential alternatives, dependence will increase (Heidi and John 1988). Furthermore, the 
investment the firm needs to put into the relationship in terms of time, effort and money, 
as well as the perceived costs of switching to and commencing an alternative exchange 
relationship, can also contribute to its dependence on another firm (Frazier 1983).  
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However, it is the firm’s perception of its dependence relative to its partner that is of most 
interest in channel relationships. With increasing dependence comes greater 
vulnerability, making one firm more susceptible to the power and influence of another 
(Frazier, Gill and Kale 1989). In general, firms will seek to reduce their dependence on 
other firms (Heidi and John 1988) and to increase the dependence of other firms upon 
itself (Lohtia and Krapfel 1994). Firms may either seek to reduce and manage 
dependence by purposely structuring their exchange relationships with other firms (Heidi 




Communication has been described as the glue that holds together a channel of 
distribution (Mohr and Nevin 1990). Communication in marketing channels serves as the 
process by which information is transmitted (Frazier and Summers 1984), programs are 
coordinated (Anderson and Narus 1990), power is exercised (Gaski 1984) and 
commitment and loyalty are encouraged (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Communication 
improves a supplier’s credibility, but may also provide a convenient and simple means of 
gaining knowledge of the supply market (Cunningham and Turnbull 1982). 
Communication will facilitate other elements of the interaction such as adaptations by 
suppliers and customers to the design or application of a product, or, the modification of 
production, distribution and administrative systems by either party (McQuiston 1989). 
 
Personal contact serves as the medium through which most communication between 
buying and selling firms occur. In the majority of cases, personal contacts and 
information exchange precedes the exchange of money and products (Ford 1982). 
Personal contacts are the normal means of persuasion and negotiation. Both buyers and 
sellers prefer personal contacts to written communications. However, personal contacts 
may also be established as a form of crisis insurance. In times of extreme difficulties, 
firms utilise these contacts as a means of obtaining more rapid or dramatic action 
(Cunningham and Turnbull 1982). Other relationships may exist purely for social reasons 
and are not necessary for the business objectives of either firm. Social contacts are an 
inevitable consequence of good functional contacts and will persist for as long as the 




The data for this project was obtained using a questionnaire mailed out to all members of 
the Wine Industry Association of Western Australia in November 1999. Given that the 
list contained the names and addresses of both wine grape growers and wineries, the list 
was cross-referenced against the list of all registered wineries to effectively place 
respondents into one of two groups.  
 
Two survey instruments were developed. Each of the wineries received a questionnaire 
asking them about the nature of the relationship they had with their most preferred grape 
grower. Conversely, each of the grape growers received a questionnaire asking them 
about the nature of their relationship with their most preferred winery. Understandably, 
because of the manner in which the respondents were selected, we were unable to 
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ascertain the extent to which, if at all, the responses received reflected the views of 
respondents in the same relationship. 
 
The questionnaire asked respondents to provide information about themselves, their 
current viticulture practices and the criteria they used in choosing appropriate trading 
partners. In order to minimise the halo effect, the questionnaire was divided into five 
blocks containing multiple item measures for each of the relationship variables being 
considered (Garbarino and Johnson 1999). Information was sought on satisfaction, trust 
and commitment, dependence and communication. Respondents were asked to respond 
to each statement on a six point scale from 1 (I disagree a lot) to 6 (I agree a lot).  
 
Satisfaction was evaluated by 6 items. With minor modifications to reflect the nature of 
the industry and the participants, the measures were adapted from previous research 
reported by Anderson and Narus (1990), Anderson and Weitz (1992), Ford (1984), 
Frazier (1983) and Ganesan (1994)(Appendix 1).  
 
Trust was assessed by 5 items based on the literature reported by Anderson and Narus 
(1990), Anderson and Weitz (1992), Ganesan (1994), Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman 
(1993) and Morgan and Hunt (1994). 
 
Commitment was measured by 3 items, developed from the literature reported by 
Anderson and Weitz (1992), Ganesan (1994), Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995), 
Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) and Morgan and Hunt (1994). 
 
Communication was measured by 8 items developed from the literature reported by 
Athaide, Meyers and Wilemon (1996), Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Ford (1984). 
 
Dependence was measured using 10 items developed from the literature reported by 
Frazier, Gill and Kale (1989), Heide and John (1988), Morgan and Hunt (1994) and 
Ganesan (1994).  
 
The responses were then analysed using principal component analysis (with varimax 
rotation and Kaiser normalisation). Those items with factor loadings below 0.5 or with 
cross-loadings greater than 0.4 were excluded (Nunnally 1978). Further clarification of 
the items contributing to each factor was achieved by applying the reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach’s alpha).   
 
In order to examine any differences in the constructs between the grape growers and 
wineries, the respondents were separated into their two respective groups and the items 
comprising each construct investigated independently using principal component 
analysis. The analysis was undertaken in this manner to confirm the unidimensionality of 
the constructs (particularly relational quality), but also because the sample size for each 
respective group was below the minimum number considered necessary for principal 








A total of 32 wineries responded to the questionnaire. Responses were obtained in similar 
proportions from each of the four major wine grape growing districts in WA. The 
majority of respondents (63%) were currently growing less than 15 hectares of wine 
grapes, although most (64%) had been growing grapes and producing wine for more than 
10 years. Most wineries (67%) did not produce wine from grapes other than those they 
had grown themselves. However, for the 33% of wineries that did purchase wine grapes, 
54% purchased more than 50% of their total crush from other grape growers.  For those 
respondents who did purchase wine grapes, 62% sourced fruit from three or more 
growers. In the majority of cases (75%), the winery had been purchasing grapes from the 
same growers for more than 5 years. 
 
A total of 26 wine grape growers responded to the questionnaire. The majority of 
respondents (43%) were from the emerging wine grape growing districts in the Warren 
Valley and South West Coast (27%) (which includes Margaret River). The majority of 
respondents (81%) were currently growing less than 10 hectares of wine grapes and most 
(58%) had been producing wine grapes for less than four years. Ordinarily, one would 
expect wine grape growers to endeavour to sell all of their fruit, however, only 45% of 
respondents sold their entire harvest. Some 31% of wine grape growers retained between 
1-25% of their harvest, presumably for the manufacture of wine under contract, with 
some 19% of grape growers retaining more than 51% of their harvest. Most respondents 
(92%) supplied fewer than 2 wineries. In only 31% of cases had the grape growers been 




From the combined sample of 58 respondents, principal component analysis provided a 
four factor solution, rather than the five factor solution as anticipated (Table 1). 
 
Factor One (relational quality) was found to be a composite measure containing elements 
of satisfaction (3 items), trust (4 items) and commitment (1 item). The construct captured 
the partner’s perceptions of being treated fairly and equitably, the extent to which the 
relationship met the partner’s expectations and the extent to which the partner’s 
cooperated with one another. The construct also captured the partner’s reputation for 
being fair, the extent to which the partner’s trusted one another, always kept their 
promises and the belief each partner had in the information provided by the other. The 
final item, drawn from commitment, was a measure of the extent to which the relationship 
was based on mutual benefit and trust. With a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.962, this construct 
was considered very robust. 
 
Factor Two (continuity) captured the partners desire to maintain the relationship. One 
item (more cost effective) was derived from satisfaction, one items (reduced risk) from 
commitment and one item (benefits exceed other offers) was derived from the 
dependence theory; in particular, the comparison to alternatives (Calt) (Anderson and 




Factor Three (power) was comprised of three items from dependence which suggested 
that one or either party was susceptible to the power and influence of the other, that it had 
to adhere to the other’s demands and that one or either party controlled the flow of 
information in the relationship. 
 
Table 1. Relationship factors in the WA wine industry. 
 
 Factor scores 
 1 2 3 4 
Treated fairly and equitably 0.927    
Relationship based on mutual benefit/trust 0.890    
Partner meets expectations 0.889    
Trust partner 0.873    
Believe information provided by partner 0.851    
Good cooperation 0.835    
Partner has a good reputation for being fair 0.815    
Partner keeps promises 0.786    
Less risky dealing with this partner   0.882   
More cost effective to stay with this partner  0.870   
Benefits exceed other offers  0.816   
Partner controls information   0.903  
Partner has all the power   0.819  
Must adhere to partners demands   0.804  
Discuss when to harvest grapes    0.916 
Discuss how to improve grape quality    0.854 
     
Eigen value 6.099 2.715 2.230 1.817 
Percent variance 38.12 16.97 13.94 11.36 
Cumulative variance 38.12 55.09 69.03 80.39 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.962 0.883 0.812 0.685 
 
 
Factor Four (communication) indicated that there was a substantial amount of 
information exchange in the relationship, particularly with regard to the harvesting of the 
grapes and discussion on various ways to improve the quality of the grapes offered for 
sale. While the Cronbach’s alpha was below that considered desirable, because of the 
exploratory nature of this research, it was retained.  
 
For Factor One, no significant differences could be detected between the growers’ 
responses and the wineries’ responses (Table 2). In both cases, the Cronbach’s alpha was 
particularly good, indicative of a very robust, although multi-dimensional construct. 
 
Similarly for Factor Two, no significant difference could be detected between the 
growers’ responses and the wineries’ responses  (Table 3). Again, the Cronbach’s alpha 
was sufficiently high for both constructs to be considered reliable.   
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For Factor Three, there was a significant difference in the items that comprised the 
construct between wineries and grape growers (Table 4). Whereas the grape growers 
indicated that they were obligated to adhere to the wineries’ demands, the wineries 
indicated no such reciprocal demands from the grape growers. Nevertheless, in both 
cases, the Cronbach’s alpha was sufficiently high to provide some degree of confidence 
in the item measures.   
 
Table 2. Relational quality between wineries and grape growers. 
 
 Factor scores 
 Winery Grape growers 
Treated fairly and equitably 0.966 0.931 
Relationship based on mutual benefit/trust 0.834 0.893 
Partner meets expectations 0.897 0.920 
Trust partner 0.841 0.938 
Believe information provided by partner 0.818 0.827 
Good cooperation 0.760 0.900 
Partner has a good reputation for being fair 0.876 0.788 
Partner keeps promises 0.686 0.909 
   
Cronbach’s alpha 0.935 0.961 
 
 
Table 3. The desire to maintain the relationship 
between wineries and grape growers 
 
 Factor scores 
 Winery Grape growers 
Less risky dealing with this partner  0.909 0.932 
More cost effective to stay with this partner 0.824 0.887 
Benefits exceed other offers 0.949 0.881 
   
Cronbach’s alpha 0.847 0.864 
 
 
Table 4. Dependence between wineries and grape growers. 
 
 Factor scores 
 Winery Grape growers 
Partner controls information 0.939 0.910 
Partner has all the power 0.936 0.794 
Must adhere to partners demands * 0.852 
   




For Factor Four, while there was no difference in the item measures that comprised the 
construct between wineries and grape growers, there was a significant difference in the 
value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Table 5). Although the construct was considered 
sufficiently reliable for the wineries’ (0.869), for the grape growers, it was well below 
that considered acceptable. 
 
Table 5. Communication between wineries and grape growers. 
 
 Factor scores 
 Winery Grape growers 
Discuss when to harvest grapes 0.941 0.872 
Discuss how to improve grape quality 0.941 0.872 
   
Cronbach’s alpha 0.869 0.607 
 
 
Discussion and implications 
 
In undertaking what we believe to be the first empirical study into the nature of long-term 
relationships in the Australian wine industry, we found a remarkably high level of 
agreement between the wineries and grape growers for each of the four relational factors 
found in the Western Australian wine industry. Such is not entirely unexpected, for 
various authors including Beuman and McLachlan (2000), Donald and Georgiadis (2000) 
and Osborn (2000) have described how through building relationships between grape 
growers and wineries, it is possible to improve the quality of the grapes received and to 
improve grape growers returns. Since such relationships are mutually beneficial, both 
parties are expected to seek to maintain the relationship, even although there is strong 
evidence that the wineries exert the majority of the power in the relationship.   
 
Where power is applied to pursue outcomes that are beneficial for both partners, such is 
unlikely to result in a deterioration of relational quality. When supported by constant 
communication that seeks to improve the quality of the grapes harvested and to advise 
grape growers of proposed harvest dates, growers’ are unlikely to feel that they have been 
the target of coercive influence strategies. For those who feel they have been mistreated, 
at least in the short-term, there are opportunities to pursue alternative relationships. 
However, as the supply of grapes increases and wineries are able to exercise more choice, 
those growers unable to produce quality grapes will find it increasingly more difficult to 
sell their harvest.  
 
While the majority of authors including Han, Wilson and Dant (1993), Ganesan (1994), 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Wilson (1995) model satisfaction, trust and commitment as 
separate constructs, Dorsch, Swanson and Kelley (1998) describe relationship quality as a 
higher-order construct containing dimensions of all three constructs. Conversely, while 
Crosby, Evans and Cowles (1990) and Leuthesser (1997) model relational quality as a 
composite measure derived from both satisfaction and trust, Kumar, Scheer and 




While evidence for this single construct (relational quality) is derived primarily from the 
relationship theory in consumer markets, we have also demonstrated its existence in an 
industrial market. We believe we have captured the construct in the context of this study 
because of the strong interdependency between business expenditure and household 
expenditure. Since the vast majority of respondents were small business enterprises with 
less than 15 hectares of grapes, given a particular level of income, an increase in the 
expenditure on production inputs can only be made at the expense of household 
consumption and vice versa. However, the extent to which this construct might be found 
in the corporate environment prevalent amongst the larger wine producers in South 
Australia, Victoria and New South Wales warrants further investigation. 
 
Furthermore, we must acknowledge that with such a small data set, we were unable to test 
the reliability and validity of both the constructs and the various item measures to the full 
extent considered necessary. Ideally, for any other research group who may wish to 
follow our lead, it would be more appropriate to investigate the nature of the relationships 
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Appendix 1.  Item measures. 
 
 Mean 
 Winery Grower 
Satisfaction   
My preferred partner often meets my expectations  4.85 4.38 
There is good cooperation between myself and my preferred partner 5.00 4.65 
My preferred partner is quick to handle complaints * 4.08 3.92 
I feel I am adequately rewarded by my preferred partner * 4.23 4.69 
My preferred partner treats me fairly and equitably 4.69 4.46 
It is more cost effective to rely on my preferred partner 4.54 4.38 
   
Trust   
My preferred partner has a reputation for being fair 4.92 4.65 
I trust my preferred partner 4.69 4.69 
I have confidence in my preferred partner * 4.69 4.77 
My preferred partner always keeps their promises 4.54 4.19 
I believe the information provided by my preferred partner 4.69 4.42 
   
Commitment   
It is less risky dealing with my preferred partner 4.62 4.62 
My relationship with my preferred partner is based on mutual benefit and trust 4.92 4.46 
I expect to continue to transact with my preferred partner in the future * S 5.46 4.58 
   
Communication   
My preferred partner frequently visits with me * 4.69 4.00 
My preferred partner and I discuss when to harvest the grapes  5.23 5.54 
My preferred partner and I discuss how we might improve grape quality 4.77 4.92 
My preferred partner and I discuss how we might coordinate schedules * HS 4.92 3.54 
My preferred partner takes a long time to agree on price *  2.85 3.04 
My preferred partner keeps me informed on technical matters * 3.77 3.46 
Its relatively easy to contact my preferred partner *  S 5.46 4.69 
My preferred partner advises me of grape quality * 4.00 4.00 
   
Dependence   
I choose to transact with many partners * 4.85 3.12 
I re-evaluate my preferred partner’s every season *   3.62 3.65 
I frequently reject other offers to buy grapes * HS 4.08  2.46 
My preferred partner has the best offer * 4.08 4.12 
The benefits I obtain from my relationship with my preferred partner exceed 
those I could obtain elsewhere 
4.69 4.38 
I am free to choose another partner at any time * 4.85 4.23 
My preferred partner has all the power 2.62 3.27 
My preferred partner controls all the information in our relationship 1.92 2.85 
I must adhere to my preferred partner’s demands HS 1.69 3.12 
Over time I have become dependent on my preferred partner * 2.38 3.12 
 
  the term “partner” was replaced with “winery” or “grape grower” depending on the target group  
  *   item was deleted 
   S    a significant difference exists between the factor means at p = 0.05  
  HS  a significant difference exists between the factor means at p = 0.01 
